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THE INVISIBLE HAND AND THE CLENCHED
FIST: IS THERE A SAFE WAY TO PICKET
UNDER THE FIRST AMENDMENT?
It has now been more than three decades since the sweeping pro-
nouncements of the United States Supreme Court in Thornhill v. Ala-
bama,' which extended First Amendment protections to picketing in
connection with a labor dispute. There, the Court recognized that
picketing is a protected form of expression, but implied -that under
certain circumstances the nature of the picketing -and ,the manner in
which it is conducted may make it a permissible subject for regula-
tion by the State. 2 However, the decision failed to demarcate clearly
the boundary between protected and unprotected forms of picketing,
and thereby left unresolved the extent to which picketing is protected
by the First Amendment.
The inability to define "protected" picketing continued to
plague the Court in a rash of labor picketing cases following Thornhill.3
The issue eventually crystallized into the speech/conduct dichotomy
first alluded to by Justice Douglas in his concurring opinion in Bakery
& Pastry Drivers, Local 802 v. Wohl.4  Stated simply, the problem is
whether picketing is more than speech; and, if so, what aspects of
picketing make it such.
This note rejects the implication in the Court's decisions that all
picketing is "speech plus" and adopts the view of some commentators
that only picketing that seeks to coerce rather than persuade its audi-
ence is "conduct" and not "speech." 5  An original analysis is pro-
posed in order to enable a court to determine whether the latter 'type
of picketing should be protected under the First Amendment. The
thrust of the approach taken in 'this note is that such picketing is in
fact advocacy and that, consequently, the First Amendment standard
1. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
2. See id. at 105.
3. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Hughes
v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
U.S. 490 (1949); Carpenters & Joiners Union of America Local No. 213 v. Ritter's
Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
4. 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring).
5. T. EMERSON, THE SYSTEM OF FREEDOM OF ExPREssIoN 434 (1970) [herein.
after cited as EMERSON]; Cox, Strikes, Picketing and the Constitution, 4 VARm. L.
REv. 574, 594 (1951) [hereinafter cited as Cox].
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to be applied to picketing is that which has evolved from cases dealing
with other types of advocacy.6 In addition to creating more meaning-
ful protections for picketing, it is hoped that this approach will serve
to remove picketing from the anomalous position to which it has been
relegated in the area of First Amendment doctrine for the last thirty
years.
The Existing Law on Picketing
The Thornhill Doctrine
In the landmark case of Thornhill v. Alabama,' the United States
Supreme Court struck down an Alabama statute making it a misde-
meanor
for any person . . . without a just cause or legal excuse [to] go
near to or loiter about the premises or place of business of any
[business] for the purpose, or with intent of influencing, or induc-
other persons not to trade with, buy from, or sell to, have business
dealings with, or be employed by [such business], or [to] picket
the works or place of business of [such business] for the purpose
of hindering, delaying or interfering with or injuring [such busi-
ness]. 8
Thornhill was one of six or eight union pickets standing in front of
the premises of the struck employer, Brown Wood Preserving Com-
pany. The picketers were attempting to prevent other employees
from going to work. In reversing Thornhill's conviction under the
Alabama statute, and striking down the statute itself, the Court stated:
In the circumstances of our times the dissemination of information
concerning the facts of a labor dispute must be regarded as within
that area of free discussion that is guaranteed by the Constitution.9
While acknowledging that the State may indeed have a legitimate
interest in regulating emploer-employee relations, the Court neverthe-
less felt that this could not serve to justify a blanket prohibition of
all peaceful picketing. Though the Court examined the doctrines of
vagueness' ° and overbreadth"' in reaching its conclusions, it ultimately
held that the constitutional standard violated in Thornhill was "the
clear and present danger" test announced by Justice Holmes in
Schenck v. United States:'
2
[T]he group in power at any moment may not impose penal sanc-
tions on peaceful and truthful discussion of matters of public inter-
6. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
7. 310 U.S. 88 (1940).
8. Id. at 91-92.
9. Id. at 102.
10. Id. at 100-01.
11. See id. at 104.
12. Id. at 104-05, citing Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 49, 52 (1919).
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est merely on a showing that others may thereby be persuaded
to take action inconsistent with its interests. Abridgement of the
liberty of such discussion can be justified only where the clear dan-
ger of substantive evil arises under circumstances affording no op-
portunity to test the merits of ideas by competition for acceptance
in the market of public opinion.
1 3
Despite its sweeping pronouncements, the Thornhll Court was
careful to confine its holding to the blanket prohibition against peace-
ful picketing contained in the Alabama statute, indicating that it prob-
ably would treat differently a narrowly drawn statute aimed .at isolated
evils.1
4
The following year the United States Supreme Court upheld a
lower court's injunction against acts of picketing which involved the
threat of violence. In Milk Wagon Drivers Union Local 753 v. Mead-
owmoor Dairies'5 the Court ruled that, "a state can choose to author-
ize its courts to enjoin acts of picketing in themselves peaceful when
they are enmeshed with contemporaneously violent conduct which is
concededly outlawed."' 6
The Retreat from Thornhill
A retreat from the broad holding of Thornhill began shortly after
the Meadowmoor decision. In Carpenters & Joiners Union of Amer-
ica Local No. 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 7 the Court upheld an injunction
granted by a Texas court against peaceful secondary picketing in the
face of a First Amendment challenge. The case involved a dispute
over the employment of non-union carpenters on the construction of
a building commissioned by Ritter. The union chose to picket Ritter's
Cafe, another business owned by Ritter which was wholly unconnected
13. Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 104 (1940). The clear and present dan-
ger test is the subject of heated debate among commentators. Even as originally con-
ceived, the test had many flaws. For one, it is so excessively vague so that the out-
come in any particular case is impossible to predict. In addition, in a complex society,
expression must inevitably conflict with other societal objectives. A formula which
permits "a state to cut off expression as soon as it becomes effective in influencing
action is incompatible with the existence of free expression." Emerson, Toward a Gen-
eral Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 877, 910-12 (1963). The prevail-
ing view among commentators is that the clear and present danger test as it has devel-
oped is no different from a weighing of a variety of complex values. Strong, Fifty
Years of "Clear and Present Danger"; From Schenck to Brandenburg-and Beyond,
1969 Sm'. Cr. Rv. 41, 55-58. Due to the complexity of the factors to be considered,
the lack of structure of such a test, and its consequent unsuitability for the judicial
process, as applied, this balancing test "gives almost conclusive weight to the legislative
judgment." Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J.
877, 912-14 (1963).
14. 310 U.S. at 105.
15. 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
16. Id. at 292.
17. 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
170 THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 26
with the construction work that was the subject of the immediate dis-
pute.
In holding that the Constitution did not prohibit Texas, in defin-
ing the boundary of permissible industrial warfare, from drawing the
line at secondary picketing, the Court balanced the interest of the
State in regulating labor-management relations with the interest of free
speech asserted by the picketers."' The Court viewed the economic
contest between employer and employee as having inevitable reper-
cussions on the well-being of the community at large and, therefore,
felt that -the state had a legitimate interest in limiting the scope of
industrial disputes. Having reached this conclusion, the Court made
no attempt to scrutinize the particular demarcation made by the state.
Thus, the decision reached was essentially a deferral to the legislative
judgment that the particular picketing before it was harmful to the
well-being of the community.' 9
However, previously the same year, the Court had struck down
a New York injunction against secondary picketing in Bakery & Pastry
Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl. 2°  In Wohl, non-union "peddlers," who
were exempt from the social security and unemployment insurance
laws of New York, rapidly had been making inroads into the collective
bargaining agreements between baking companies and bakery drivers.
Attempts to unionize the peddlers had failed. In a last-ditch effort
to prevent the further erosion of union jobs, the union suggested to
the peddlers -that they drive only six days a week and employ an un-
employed union driver one day a week. The offer was rejected.
Thereafter, the union picketed both the bakeries from which the ped-
dlers bought their goods and the retail stores to which they sold them.
The New York court enjoined this activity. In striking down the in-
junction, the Supreme Court ruled that:
We ourselves can perceive no substantive evil of such magnitude
as to mark a limit to the right of free speech which the petitioners
sought to exercise.21
What, then, made the Court reach such apparently contradictory
conclusions in the two cases? Texas and New York tried to do essen-
tially the same thing-make secondary22 picketing illegal. In Ritter's
18. See id. at 726.
19. Interestingly enough, in A.F. of L. v. Swing, 312 U.S. 321 (1941), picketing
by non-employee union members, who technically had no dispute with the employer
picketed, was deemed protected under the First Amendment.
20. 315 U.S. 769 (1942).
21. Id. at 775.
22. The activity in Wohl was secondary in the sense that the unions had a dis-
pute with the peddlers but picketed the bakeries from which they bought and sold their
goods. In Ritter's Cafe, the union's dispute was connected with the construction of
a building commissioned by Ritter, yet they chose to picket the cafe owned by Ritter
with which they had no dispute. In this sense their activity was secondary.
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Cafe, the picketing led to a sympathy strike by both the unionized
employees of Ritter's Cafe and -truck drivers who delivered supplies
to the Cafe and, consequently, to a loss of some 60 percent of Ritter's
business.2" In Wohl, the picketing was ineffective because no real
economic pressure was exerted as a result of the picketers' efforts.
But surely the applicability of First Amendment protection cannot rest
solely on whether or not the picketers achieve their purpose. In Rit-
ter's Cafe, the Court made some attempt to rationalize its apparently
inconsistent rulings, distinguishing WohI on the grounds that there, the
business of the retailers picketed was "directly involved in the dis-
pute."2 4 However, the fact that the union picketed the employer with
whom the dispute existed at a separate business operated by him does
not seem to make him any less "directly involved."
Such hair-splitting distinctions were, in fact, soon to be aban-
doned. Justice Douglas' concurring opinion in Wohl contained the ra-
tionale for what was to 'become a gradual erosion of the Thornhill
doctrine:
Picketing by an organized group is more than free speech, since
it involves patrol of a particular locality and since the very pres-
ence of a picket line may induce action of one kind or another,
quite irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being dis-
seminated. Hence, those aspects of picketing make it the subject
of restrictive regulation. 2
5
This analysis of picketing allowed for the inference that all picketing
might be classified solely as "conduct" rather than "speech." As such,
it would be beyond the protection of the First Amendment. For a
Court weary of the flood of litigation provoked by the Thornhill deci-
sion, Justice Douglas' approach was a long-awaited and easily accepted
solution to the speech/conduct dilemma underlying its previous deci-
sions on picketing.
"Speech Plus" and the "Unlawful Purpose" Doctrine
The first of the cases to use Justice Douglas' analysis was Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.26 In Giboney, unionized ice peddlers
picketed Empire Storage & Ice Company, a wholesale ice distributor,
23. 315 U.S. at 724.
24. Id. at 727. In Ritter's Cafe, the Court never stated that the test being ap-
plied there was that of "clear and present danger." However, a careful reading of this
opinion, which attempted to distinguish Thornhill and Wohl, both of which applied the
clear and present danger test, leads to the conclusion that this was indeed the test used
by the Court in Ritters Cafe. Interestingly enough, the approach taken by the Court
in attempting to weigh the various societal interests involved is yet another indication
of the metamorphosis of "clear and present danger" into a balancing test with all of
its resultant drawbacks. See note 14 supra.
25. 315 U.S. 769, 776-77 (1942) (Douglas, J., concurring).
26. 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
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in an attempt to compel the company not to sell ice to non-union ice
peddlers. Unionized truck drivers employed by establishments doing
business with Empire refused to deliver goods to or from Empire's
place of business; in fact, had they done so, they would have been
subject to fine or suspension by their own unions. As a result of
these actions, Empire's business dropped 85 percent. The company
contended that compliance with the union's demands not to sell ice
to non-union peddlers would constitute a violation of Missouri's anti-
trust law. The company subsequently obtained an injunction against
the picketing, claiming that the union's activities were unlawful be-
cause their purpose was -to compel Empire to violate valid state law.
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice Black adopted Justice
Douglas' approach in Wohl that picketing may include conduct other
than speech and could, therefore, be regulated even when conducted
in a peaceful manner.27  In his view, the pickets in Giboney were
not attempting to "peacefully publicize truthful facts about a labor
dispute"; rather their activities "constituted a single integrated course
of conduct, which was in violation of Missouri's valid law."'28 In decid-
ing that the picketing in Giboney was more than speech, Black did
not specify any criteria by which a reviewing court might make such
a determination in the future. Instead, he based his conclusion on
the combination of several factors such as the patrolling, unlawful ob-
jective, illegal transportation combination and threats of suspension by
the union.29
Giboney and its progeny were eventually interpreted as standing
for the proposition that because picketing is more than speech, any
picketing which sought to achieve a purpose that was contrary to valid
state policy, whether enunciated through state statutory or decisional
law, could be constitutionally regulated.3" On the basis of this reason-
ing, the Court in Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc.31 upheld an in-
junction against "stranger picketing," a term of art in labor law used
to describe picketing by non-employee union members. The Court
accepted the state's justification that ,the picketing was violative of the
state policy prohibiting employers from coercing employees in their
choice of bargaining representatives. Essentially, the argument was
that the union's objective in picketing was to organize the employees
of the picketed establishment, and eventually to enter into a collective
bargaining agreement with the picketed employer. The detrimental
27. Id. at 501.
28. Id. at 498. Though the facts in Giboney are similar to those in Ritter's
Cafe, conceptually they are totally different. Giboney is a departure from the cases
preceding it in that the rationale for the decision is based on the premise that the pick-
eting involved is more than speech.
29. Id.
30. Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284, 291 (1957).
31. 354 U.S. 284 (1957).
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economic impact of the picketing on the picketed establishment will
coerce the employer in turn to coerce his employees to join the union.
Therefore, the purpose of the picketing is to coerce the employer to
force his employees to join the union against their wishes, and is con-
sequently an unlawful one.
The most extreme application of the unlawful purpose doctrine,
however, is -the decision in Hughes v. Superior Court,32 a case arising
in California. In Hughes, a black civil rights group picketed a grocery
store located in a black neighborhood in an effort to compel the store
to hire black retail clerks on a quota basis until the proportion of
black clerks to white clerks equaled the proportion of black customers
to white customers. The California Supreme Court held that the pick-
eting could constitutionally be enjoined as contrary to California's pol-
icy against racial discrimination enunciated through decisional law.3"
The picketers argued that their actions sought 'to rectify the discrimina-
tory practices of ,the store in the past. Nevertheless, the court held
that, although picketing to protest such policies was unlawful, picket-
ing to remedy past injustices through a quota hiring plan was not.34
In his dissent, Justice Traynor alluded to the irony in the court's deci-
sion: the policy against discrimination -that was invoked to justify re-
straint of the picketing was in fact designed to protect the very group
of picketers against whom it was being used in Hughes.3"
The United States Supreme Court upheld the injunction under
the "unlawful purpose" doctrine. However, the Court made little at-
tempt to scrutinize California's characterization of the picketing as
unlawful, merely accepting the California Supreme Court's policy de-
termination as conclusive. This standard of review leaves room for
neither the "clear and present danger" test nor for "balancing." Thus,
once the picketing is deemed to be for an "unlawful purpose," it is
entirely excluded from First Amendment protections. As Professor
Emerson has noted:
This position, in effect, eliminates all constitutional protections for
picketing, since the government can always make the objective of
picketing contrary to public policy by enacting a law or by merely
saying so.30
A Reprieve for Thornhill
Did these cases, mentioned above, spell the demise of the Thorn-
hill doctrine? Federal preemption of the labor area -temporarily halted
32. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
33. Hughes v. Superior Court, 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), aff'd, 339
U.S. 460 (1950).
34. Id. at 855, 198 P.2d at 888.
35. See id. at 867-68, 198 P.2d at 895-96 (Traynor, J., dissenting).
36. EMERsoN, supra note 5, at 446.
the flood of labor picketing cases when some types of picketing pre-
viously outlawed by the states became permissible under the National
Labor Relations Act. In 1964, however, the Court's decision in
NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 76017 hinted at some modification of
the "unlawful purpose" doctrine enunciated in Giboney and the con-
curring opinion in Wohl.
In the Fruit Packers case, the Court was faced with construction
of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
provision outlawing secondary boycotts. 38 The union was engaged in
a strike against fruit packers and warehousemen in Washington. In
order to exert economic pressure on the packers and warehousemen,
the union instituted a consumer boycott of Washington apples, and
picketed retail chain stores that marketed the apples. One such chain
was Safeway. Pickets were placed in front of all the Safeway stores
in Seattle to ask consumers not -to buy Washington state apples.
The National Labor Relations Board found this activity to be a vio-
lation of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B).39 The United States Supreme Court
reversed, holding that section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) did not outlaw picketing
which persuaded consumers to boycott the struck product, but only
prohibited the union from asking customers not to patronize the sec-
ondary employer. Though Justice Brennan, writing for the majority,
grounded his decision on statutory construction of the words "threaten,
coerce or restrain" in section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B), he perceived that a
broad ban on peaceful picketing "might collide with the guarantees
of the First Amendment.1
40
Justice Black, in his concurring opinion, felt that section 8(b)
(4)(ii)(B) did prohibit the activity before the Court, and hence he
reached the constitutional issues.4 ' Under his analysis, picketing must
be divided into two parts: "(1) Patrolling, that is, standing or march-
ing back or forth or round and round on the street, sidewalks, private
property, or elsewhere, generally adjacent to someone else's prmises;
[and] (2) speech, that is, arguments, usually on a placard, made to
persuade other people to take the picketer's side of the controversy."
Where the two parts are intertwined, the courts must "weigh the cir-
cumstances" and "appraise the substantiality of the reasons advanced"
37. 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
38. Section 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) of the National Labor Relations Act makes it an un-
fair labor practice for a union to "threaten, coerce or restrain any person," with the
object of "forcing or requiring any person to cease using, handling, transporting, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any producer . . . or to cease doing business with
any other person .... ." 29 USC § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970).
39. 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961), vacated, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
40. 377 U.S. at 63.
41. Id. at 76 (Black, J., concurring).
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in support of the regulation of picketing.4" Since the statute under
scrutiny was not worded so as to ban all peaceful picketing, Justice
Black concluded that it was aimed at the speech aspects of picketing.
For this reason, he found it to be unconstitutional.
Black distinguished Giboney on the grounds that there, the pur-
pose of the picketing was unlawful.43 The reasoning he employed
to reach this conclusion is somewhat circuitous and, it is submitted,
inconsistent with the Giboney-Wohl -line of cases. In finding that the
picketers in Fruit Packers had a lawful purpose, Justice Black relied
heavily on the publicity proviso of section 8(b)(4)(ii)(B), which pro-
vides as follows:
[N]othing contained in § 8(b) (4) (ii) (B) ...shall be construed
to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members
of a labor organization, that a product or products are produced
by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary
dispute and are distributed by another employer. .... 44
Under Black's view, since the purpose of the picketing in Fruit
Packers was explicitly sanctioned by the statute the means employed
to achieve that purpose, namely picketing, cannot serve to characterize
the picketing itself as unlawful. In essence, his position is this: If
information conveyed by the picketers is lawful, picketing to convey
that information cannot be deemed unlawful. The necessary implica-
tion of such an analysis is -that if "pure speech" carries a message that
is immune from state regulation under the First Amendment, then any
picket signs conveying the same message are likewise immune.
Black's view, laudable though it may be, undermines the very
foundation of the "unlawful purpose" doctrine of Giboney and its prog-
eny. In those cases, the proposition that picketing was more than
speech triggered the application of the "unlawful purpose" doctrine.
However, those decisions never implied that "pure speech" could be
regulated on the mere assertion that it was contrary to some nebulous
state policy. Indeed, a necessary concomitant of a finding that picket-
ing may be constitutionally regulated is the underlying premise that
picketing is more than speech. In other words, the Court must find
both that the picketing has an "unlawful purpose" and that it is
"speech plus." Perhaps Justice Black's approach is an attempt to treat
picketing like other forms of expression rather than as a distinctive
type of expression meriting the creation of a unique body of law.
In Police Department of Chicago v. Mosely,45 a picketing case
of a slightly different genre, the Court invalidated as unconstitutional
42. Id. at 77-78.
43. Id. at 79.
44. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(4)(ii)(B) (1970).
45. 408 U.S. 92 (1972).
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an ordinance prohibiting all picketing within 150 feet of a school
other than that arising out of a labor dispute with the school. Prior
to the enactment of the ordinance, Mosely had been picketing Jones
Commercial High School in Chicago to protest the school's admission
policies which he alleged favored black students. Subsequent to the
enactment of the ordinance, he was told by police that a resumption
of his activities would be deemed a violation of the ordinance. Mosley
brought suit to invalidate the ordinance on the grounds that it was un-
constitutional.
Although the Court's decision was based on the equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, Justice Marshall, writing for the
majority, noted that "the equal protection claim is closely intertwined
with First Amendment interests,"46 and went on to reach the under-
lying First Amendment issues. He characterized the classification
drawn by the ordinance in the following way:
The central problem with Chicago's ordinance is that it describes
permissible picketing in terms of its subject matter. Peaceful pic-
keting on the subject of the school's labor management dispute is
permitted but all other peaceful picketing is prohibited. But,
above all else, the First Amendment means that government has
no power to restrict expression because of its message, its ideas,
its subject matter or its content.
47
While holding that the ordinance was unconstitutional, Justice Marshall
nevertheless conceded that picketing sometimes might be constitu-
tionally regulated. However, the only limitations on picketing which
he perceived as permissible were those of time, place and manner or
threats to the public order, the very limitations generally applied to
"pure speech."
It is important to note that the picketing in Mosley was of a dif-
ferent type than that involved in the Giboney-Wohl line of cases, be-
cause the picketing in the latter was designed to exert economic pres-
sure, while in Mosley it was not. However, Justice Marshall made
no attempt to distinguish Giboney and its progeny on their facts, nor
did the Court in those cases ever make any distinction between eco-
nomic and psychological pressure. In other words, conceptually, use
of economic pressure to achieve an unlawful objective is not a neces-
sary concomitant of the "unlawful purpose" doctrine.
Although this distinction was never expressly articulated by the
Court, its importance cannot be summarily dismissed. It is submitted
that the earlier picketing decisions' s were influenced in large part by
46. Id. at 95.
47. Id.
48. See, e.g., Teamsters Local 695 v. Vogt, Inc., 354 U.S. 284 (1957); Hughes
v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336
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the fact that the picketers in those cases were using economic pressure
to achieve their objectives. If this were not the case, it would appear
that the Court has come full circle, and that Mosley represents a rejec-
tion of the Giboney reasoning and a reiteration of the Thornhill doc-
trine.
Even if Mosley is viewed as the Court's definitive position on
picketing, the opinion offers incomplete guidance for the future anal-
ysis of picketing cases. For instance, there was no allegation in Mos-
ley that the objective of the picketing was unlawful, but merely that
the situs of the picketing was such. Had Chicago argued instead that
the objective of the picketing was itself violative of the state policy
favoring affirmative action programs, the result might have been dif-
ferent. Whatever the status of Mosley, however, the fact remains that
development of a coherent set of rules governing picketing cannot be
accomplished without first resolving which aspects of picketing are
"conduct" and which are "speech."
Picketing-Speech or Conduct?
To what extent, then, is picketing "conduct" rather than
"speech"? Is it only some picket lines which induce "action. . .quite
irrespective of the nature of the ideas which are being disseminated," 49
or is this a characteristic of all picket lines, as Justice Frankfurter be-
lieved:
The loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are
unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word. 50
Justice Frankfurter's view implies that picketing is blessed with some
mystical quality not enjoyed by other forms of expression, a view
which does not withstand critical examination.
Conceptually, all picketing can be divided into two broad cate-
gories on the basis of whether the support of the audience appealed
to is sympathetically or coercively enlisted. The operative distinction
in this analysis is whether the picketers are members of an organized
and powerful combination by virtue of which 'they can impose eco-
nomic sanctions, withhold economic benefits and -threaten social os-
tracism of a degree and magnitude which would enable them to coerce
their audience into doing what they demand.51 The kind of apprehen-
sions and fears created by -this type of picketing rise far above the
minimal social embarrassment sometimes associated with crossing
U.S. 490 (1949); Carpenters & Joiners Union of America Local No. 213 v. Ritter's
Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
49. Bakery Drivers Local 802 v. Wohl, 315 U.S. 769 (1942) (Douglas, J., con-
curring).
50. Hughes v. Superior Court, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1950).
51. See generally Cox, supra note 5; EMERSON, supra note 5.
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picket lines. The merits of the dispute become irrelevant because the
picketers' appeal is directed towards a coerced audience; the support
of the audience appealed to is ensured by "a system of power based
upon common economic interests, loyalties, social pressures, economic
sanctions and bureaucratic force." 2
Picketing by a union where the appeal for support is directed al-
most exclusively at other union members often falls within this cate-
gory. The union picket line under these circumstances operates as
a "signal" to other union members to cease working for the picketed
employer, and to stop transporting goods to and from his place of busi-
ness. The refusal of the union member to cross a union picket line
is motivated largely by his fear of economic sanctions or loss of his
union membership. The success of this type of picketing is therefore
a result of the economic leverage wielded against the hapless union
member and not of the fact that he is in basic sympathy with the pick-
eters' cause. This type of picketing, entitled "signal picketing" by
Professor Archibald Cox,5 3 should therefore be excluded entirely from
First Amendment protections.
However, not all picketing by unions can be classified as "signal
picketing." This is particularly true where the audience appealed to
is the public at large. However powerful a union may be, it has no
control over members of the general public and can only enlist their
support by persuading them of the merits of the picketers' position
and the rightness of their cause. The audience appealed to is, there-
fore, an uncoerced one. Most non-union picketing is likewise directed
at the general public and not at members of a group to which the
picketers belong. Consumer, tenant and civil rights groups, for
instance, are generally small and loosely organized and therefore can
neither exact blind loyalty in their audiences nor invoke threats of eco-
nomic sanctions. "Picketing under such circumstances is a call to rea-
son, not the application of economic coercion, and as such must be
characterized as expression. ' 54 This type of picketing is labled "pub-
licity picketing" by Professor Cox.55
It should be made clear at the outset that classification as "pub-
licity picketing" is not dependent upon the picketers' success in con-
vincing their audience of the merits of the particular dispute at issue.
For instance, a consumer aware of the plight of migrant farm workers
in California, and supportive of the union's efforts to alleviate their
situation, might observe a farm worker union picket line because of
their basic sympathy, even though the consumer was not familiar with
52. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 445.
53. Cox, supra note 5, at 595-96.
54. EMERSON, supra note 5, at 445; accord, Cox, supra note 5 ,at 594.
55. Cox, supra note 5, at 594-96.
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the facts of the particular dispute involved. This activity is no less
"expression" because the persuasive power of the union was effective
prior to the picketing. Publicity picketing embraces any activity which
enlists support because of the beliefs and sympathies of the consumer
and does not require that each consumer or union member become
an instant convert upon seeing -the message on the picket sign. It
is only where the loyalty is exacted by the use of powerful economic
threats that the picketing loses its protected character.
The first case to exclude picketing from First Amendment protec-
tions on the ground that the picketing was more than speech was Gib-
oney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co.,56 an example of signal picketing.
Had the truck drivers in Giboney crossed the union picket lines, they
would have been subject to fine or suspension by their unions.T In
Ritter's Cafe,18 the picketing involved was again primarily "signal pick-
eting." The success of the union's picket line was achieved in large
part because the unionized employees of Ritter's Cafe refused to cross
the union picket line.59
On the other hand, -the picketing in Hughes v. Superior Court0
was an example of publicity picketing, as Justice Traynor implied in
his dissent in the California Supreme Court.61 Similarly, in NLRB
v. Fruit & Vegetable Packers Local 760,62 the union was seeking to
enlist the support of Safeway customers over which it exercised no
coercive influence; I.e., the picketing involved was again publicity
picketing. Another example of union picketing of the same genre is
the table grape boycott instituted by the United Farm Workers Union.
The success of this boycott was achieved by an appeal directed exclu-
sively to the consuming public. Consumers who decided not to pur-
chase grapes did so because they believed that migrant farm workers
should be represented by a union of their choice.
The practical difficulties inherent in classifying picketing as "pub-
licity" or "signal" can be overcome by the use of an evidentiary rule.
All picketing by unions which is directed primarily at union members
would presumptively be deemed signal picketing. The union could,
however, rebut this presumption by a showing that no economic lever-
age was either threatened or used in enforcing observance of the pick-
et line. Conversely, all picketing by unions or other groups that is di-
rected at the general public would presumptively be deemed publicity
56. 336 U.S. 490 (1949). See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
57. Id. at 493.
58. 315 U.S. 722 (1942). See text accompanying notes 17-24 supra.
59. See id. at 723-24.
60. 32 Cal. 2d 850, 198 P.2d 885 (1948), affd, 339 U.S. 460 (1950). See text
accompanying notes 32-35 supra.
61. 32 Cal. 2d at 867, 871, 198 P.2d at 895, 897.
62. 377 U.S. 58 (1964). See text accompanying notes 37-44 supra.
picketing. This presumption could likewise be rebutted by a showing
that the picketing group had available to it powerful economic weapons
which had been threatened and used in securing the effectiveness of
the picket line. (However, isolated instances involving the use of such
threats would not serve to characterize the picketing as "signal pick-
eting.") The classification should be based on whether the coercive
elements are predominant or incidential:
"The critical inquiry is whether the employees' conduct involves
an appeal to an uncoerced audience each individual in which is
left free to choose his own course of conduct or invoke the power
of an organized combination. '63
Professor Charles Gregory, a commentator in this field of law,
finds such distinctions meaningless.64 In his view, the distinction be-
tween "signal" and "publicity" picketing only "places a premium on
[the] ineffectiveness of -the picketing, based on the differences in de-
gree of the economic coercion sympathetically enlisted."6 5  The crit-
ical issue to Gregory is the coercive impact of the picketing on the
picketed establishment, and not the coercive impact on those whose
aid is enlisted.66  Thus, under his analysis, the fact that the coercion
is achieved by means of picketing should be constitutionally irrelevant.
In other words, if -the use of economic pressure is the critical factor
to be considered in determining whether a particular form of expres-
sion is protected, then appeals to consumers through newspaper adver-
tisements and radio and television broadcasts, though technically "pure
speech," would be treated no differently than picketing. 67
Most expression, however, is aimed at persuading the listener to
embark on a course of action:
"Free trade in ideas" means free trade in the opportunity to per-
suade to action, not merely to describe facts . ... Indeed, the
whole history of the problem shows it is to the end of preventing
action that repression is primarily directed and to preserving the
right to urge it that the protections are given.68
The word "coercion" has a pejorative connotation, but in its lit-
eral sense, all expression that seeks a particular result is intended to
"coerce." The purpose of anti-war demonstrators holding rallies in
Washington was to "coerce" legislators to stop the Vietnam war; simi-
larly, sit-ins at lunch counters in the South were designed to "coerce"
private establishments to integrate their facilities.
63. Cox, supra note 5, at 602.
64. Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Union and Em-
ployer Conduct, 49 MICH. L. REv. 191, 206-07 (1950).
65. Id. at 207.
66. Id.
67. Cox, supra note 5, at 601.
68. Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 537 (1945).
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A recent case involving leafletting by a community group is illus-
trative. In Organization For A Better Austin v. Keefe,69 -the United
States Supreme Court struck down an Illinois injunction against leaflet-
ting. The Organization For A Better Austin (OBA) was engaged in
an effort to stop Keefe, a real estate broker, from "panic peddling."
According to the OBA, Keefe was engaged in practices that were de-
signed to arouse in local white residents the fear that blacks were go-
ing -to take over Austin. As a result of the emotions enflamed by
these practices, Keefe was able to secure listings and sell to blacks.
The OBA was engaged in an effort to stabilize the ethnic makeup
of Austin and to pressure Keefe to stop his practice of soliciting real
estate business in Austin by playing on racial fears. Toward this end,
leaflets were circulated in the area in which Keefe's business was lo-
cated, asking people to contact Keefe to urge him to sign a "no-solici-
tation" agreement.
Keefe argued that the leafletting was designed to force him to
sign the "no-solicitation" agreement. In response to this allegation,
the Court stated:
The claim that the expressions were intended to exercise a coer-
cive impact on respondent does not remove them from the reach
of the First Amendment. Petitioners plainly intended to influence
respondent's conduct by their activities; this is not fundamentally
different from the function of a newspaper.70
Thus the issue, as framed by .the Court's analysis, is whether the ap-
plication of economic pressure is a form of coercion so significantly
different from the types of psychological pressure enumerated above
as to warrant special treatment.
Economics-Myth and Reality
The application of economic pressure is a hallowed American tra-
dition, although, when Adam Smith wrote Wealth of Nations in
1776,71 he did not foresee that the forces of supply and demand could
bring about political as well as economic changes through the market-
place. Inherent in the nature of consumerism is the buyer's ability
to make a choice. Traditionally, such choices have been governed by
purely economic considerations: whether the product was inexpen-
sive, how long it would last, how effective it was for the purpose in-
tended, etc. Today's consumer, however, may look at several other
non-economic factors: what effect will it have on the environment;
whether the manufacturer exploits his employees; whether the product
69. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
70. Id. at 419.
71. A. SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF
NATIONS (1776).
is manufactured in a country which has a repressive government. All
of these considerations have a "coercive" impact on the particular pro-
ducer, and the very function of the free market system is to weed out
unpopular products and replace them with those which consumers de-
sire.
Those who view economic pressure of the type involved in pub-
licity picketing as a dangerous modem phenomenon that will destroy
-the free market system are laboring under a misapprehension. It is
axiomatic that what is produced and the price it commands is a func-
tion of the interaction of supply and demand. However, what is most
frequently misunderstood by the lay person is what determines de-
mand. Professor Paul Samuelson puts it this way:
The Consumer, so it is said is king or rather, with every man king,
each is a voter who uses his money as votes to have the things
done that -he wants done. His votes must compete with other
men's votes, and the people with the most votes end up with the
most influence on what gets produced and on where those goods
go. 7
Economics makes no value judgments on the motives of consumers
or on why the dollar votes are cast in a particular manner, but requires
only that they be cast so as to maximize an individual consumer's well-
being within the framework of priorities that that consumer sets for
himself.
[T]he economist studies mental states rather through their mani-
festations than in themselves and if he finds they afford evenly
balanced incentives to action, 'he treats them prima facie as for
his purpose equal.
73
The assumption that a necessary concomitant of a viable free mar-
ket system is that consumers make only those choices that are moti-
vated by purely economic considerations is as insidious as it is false.
It is this type of thinking that has relegated picketing to such an anom-
alous position in the area of First Amendment doctrine.
It does not affect the theory of demand in the least whether the
individual maximizes wealth, religious piety, the annihilation of
crooners, or his waistline.74
The mandate of economics is clear: Choose as you want, as long as
you choose what you want.
One of the prerequisites to the attainment of the perfect competi-
tion model is that consumers have complete information about the
goods that are produced. 5 If consumers are in fact motivated by "so-
cial" factors, the necessary implication is that they must have the rele-
72. P. SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 58 (9th ed. 1973).
73. A. MARSHALL, PRiNCIPALS OF ECONOMICS 16 (8th ed. 1948).
74. G. STIGLER, TiE THEORY OF PRICE 63-64 (1946).
75. See id. at 63.
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vant information in order to make their choices. Thus, rather than
doing violence to the notion of a free enterprise system, publicity pick-
eting serves a vital function in providing consumers with some of this
information. In the area of such picketing, simplistic distinctions be-
tween "economic" and "politicar' spheres serve no useful purposes but
result only in a perpetuation of the myth that this type of advocacy will
destroy the economic fabric of American society.
Under Professor Gregory's view, the Thornhill line of cases
should be overruled "saving the constitutional guarantee of free
speech for the situations it was intended to cover."76  However, the
success of publicity picketing is ensured by an appeal to the consum-
er's social views, and therefore, the First Amendment has a vital role
to play. Gregory's approach would serve the purpose of making First
Amendment protections meaningless.
The separation of picketing into signal picketing and public-
ity picketing thus goes a long way towards resolving the speech/con-
duct dilemma in the picketing cases and provides the court with
a practicable basis on which to decide whether or not First Amend-
ment protections are necessary.
Picketing as Speech-The Applicability of the
First Amendment
Even "publicity picketing" may be subjected to some valid regu-
lation under the First Amendment. The Court has repeatedly con-
ceded that reasonable restrictions of "time, place and manner" on ex-
pression are constitutionally permissible. 77  The First Amendment
does not require states to tolerate violent conduct or obstruction of
the public streets merely because the right to free speech is involved,
and such regulatory statutes are permissible so long as they are nar-
rowly drawn to protect only against such conduct and do not give pub-
lic officials unfettered discretion in enforcing them. 76 Similarly, pick-
eting constitutionally may be subjected to such restrictions.79 How-
ever, this analysis is inapplicable where it is the subject matter of the
picketing and not the manner in which it is conducted that is under
attack.
In almost all the cases decided by the United States Su-
preme Court, the state injunctions were aimed at the subject matter
76. Gregory, Constitutional Limitations on the Regulation of Union and Em-
ployer Conduct, 49 MICH. L. REV. 191, 207 (1950).
77. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
536, 554 (1965) (dictum); Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
78. See Lovell v. Griffin, 303 U.S. 444 (1938).
79. Police Dept. v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 98 (1972). See text accompanying
notes 45-47 supra.
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of the picketing and not the manner in which it was conducted. Under
Justice Black's view in NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760,80 and Justice
Marshall's view in Police Department v. Mosley,8' classification of per-
missible picketing in terms of its subject matter is invalid. However,
in neither Mosley nor Fruit Packers was the message on the picket
sign itself characterized as unlawful. In Fruit Packers, for example,
Justice Black found, by somewhat strained reasoning, that because sec-
tion 8(b)(4)(ii)(B) expressly permitted use of means other than pick-
eting to appeal to the public, the same appeal made through picketing
was likewise lawful. Similarly, in Mosley there was no allegation that
the purpose for which Mosely was picketing was unlawful, but merely
that the Chicago ordinance did not permit that type of picketing in
the vicinity of a school.82
One way of deciding whether the picketing is protected is to de-
termine whether it presents a "clear and present danger" of a "sub-
stantive evil" against which -the state may validly protect its citizens,
the test announced in Schenck v. United States.8 3 As pointed out ear-
lier in this note, this approach has often amounted to nothing more
than an ad hoc balancing test, where the weight given to First Amend-
ment interests is not clearly articulated.8 4 Due to this major deficiency
of the "clear and present danger" test, the outcome in a particular
case is often merely a deferral to the legislative judgment before the
Court, a standard of review that offers no meaningful protection for
expression.
Critical examination of the "unlawful purpose" doctrine suggests
a different line of analysis. When a state enjoins picketing because
its purpose is unlawful, it is saying that the message the picketers wish
to convey is unlawful. However, the views of the picketers are not
just abstract beliefs. They are urging a particular course of action.
When the state seeks to regulate these views, such regulation is aimed
at suppression of this advocacy. In publicity picketing, the picketers
are advocating a course of action for the patrons of the picketed estab-
lishment, and for the establishment itself. When the state enjoins that
picketing on the grounds that it has a purpose which is contrary to
a state policy, it is saying, in effect, that the action urged by the pick-
eters would itself violate that policy. The determination that must be
made, then, is to what extent the state can claim that the picketers
are advocating a course of action that is "unlawful" and thereby pro-
scribe such advocacy.
80. 377 U.S. 58, 78-89 (1964) (Black, J., concurring).
81. 408 U.S. 92, 95.
82. See text accompanying notes 47-49 supra.
83. 249 U.S. 47, 52 (1919).
84. See note 14 supra.
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Under the rule announced by the United States Supreme Court
in Brandenburg v. Ohio, 5 a state can only proscribe advocacy of the
use of force or violation of law where such advocacy is intended to
incite imminent lawless action and is likely to produce such action. 8
It is unclear whether -the Brandenburg opinion represents a new stand-
ard of review in First Amendment cases or merely a restated version
of the "clear and present danger" .test; but, in any event, the analytical
tools devised in Brandenburg are particularly appropriate in determin-
ing the extent to which picketing is protected by the First amend-
ment, because of the necessity of showing that the danger from the
advocacy be demonstrable immediately rather than in the future. In
other words, under the Brandenburg test, the state cannot proscribe
advocacy where its alleged harmful effects are remote and specula-
tive.
8 7
Whatever the defects of Brandenburg in relation to revolutionary
advocacy,88 it can provide meaningful protections for picketing. The
focus of this analysis is not on the "imminence" of the action advocated
by the picketers, but on the imminence of that action violating -the
state policy used to justify restraint of the picketing. In other words,
if the action urged does not itself violate the state policy used to justify
restraint of the picketing, the advocacy of that action cannot be pro-
scribed. If the Brandenburg standard is applied to publicity picketing,
then the state is required to show that the action urged violates its
laws before it can enjoin that picketing.
It is true that the line of cases culminating in Brandenburg in-
volved proscription of such advocacy through state criminal law. How-
ever, injunctions are enforced by the sanction of civil contempt, a pen-
alty no less onerous than a criminal one. Nor can it be said that Bran-
denburg only applies to advocacy of the violent overthrow of govern-
ment. The rule as announced therein applies both to the use of force
and of violation of law. The underlying premise of the Brandenburg
holding is that restriction of speech cannot be justified where its alleg-
edly harmful effects are a matter of conjecture.
The extent of protection afforded picketing should -therefore be
determined in light of -the rules set forth in Brandenburg. Picketers
in publicity picketing are generally advocating two ends: that consum-
ers of the picketed establishment embark on a particular course of ac-
tion, and that the picketed establishment itself embark on a particular
course of action. On the basis of the Brandenburg holding, the state
85. 395 U.S. 444 (1969).
86. Id. at 447.
87. See generally Linde, "Clear and Present Danger" Reexamined: Dissonance
in the Brandenburg Concerto, 22 STAN. L. REv. 1163 (1970).
88. See generally id.
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can enjoin the picketing only if it is able to show that a state law would
be violated if either the picketed establishment or its patrons agree
to act as urged. It is submitted -that in the overwhelming majority
of situations the action urged by the picketers is unquestionably lawful.
Examination of different types of publicity picketing illustrates
this proposition. Hughes v. Superior Court,89 for instance, was an ex-
ample of this type of picketing. As previously discussed, the picketers
in Hughes were engaged in an effort to get the picketed store to insti-
tute a hiring plan favoring black applicants in order to compensate for
its past discriminatory employment policies. No law prohibited the
store in Hughes from adopting such a plan. To say, then, that the
picketers were urging a violation of California's policy against racial
discrimination is absurd. Thus, the result of the holding in Hughes
is to make advocacy of lawful action unlawful!
Furthermore, the action urged on the patrons of the pick-
eted store by the picketers was also lawful. Consumers in Hughes
had a choice-they could shop at a store that had discriminated on
the basis of race, or they could patronize one that made good faith
efforts to treat job applicants in a non-discriminatory manner. In this
case they were being urged not to patronize a store that discriminated
against black applicants, as indeed they had a right not to do, until
such time as that store corrected its discriminatory practices. It is dif-
ficult to understand then how it could be argued that the picketers
were advocating a course of action that violated state law.
Picketing by tenant groups likewise constitutes advocacy of lawful
action. This is illustrated by the situation where tenants picket the
apartment building of a slum landlord and urge that he repair
the building and that tenants of that building refuse to pay their rent
until such time as he does so. The state in such a case might argue,
as the lower court found in Organization For A Better Austin v.
Keefe, 90 that such picketing was in violation of the state policy in favor
of protecting an individual's privacy. Clearly, there is no law prohibit-
ing a landlord from repairing his property. Thus, the action advocated
as to him is lawful. Tenants who refuse to pay their rent may
of course be evicted, and the landlord may bring a court action to col-
lect the amount due. However, no law requires that they pay their
rent as long as they are willing to take the consequences of their ac-
tions. Therefore, it cannot be said that the rent-strike picketers are
advocating action that is unlawful.
The consumer boycott instituted by the farm workers union pre-
sents another example. There, the action urged is either that con-
89. 339 U.S. 460 (1950).
90. 402 U.S. 415 (1971).
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sumers refuse to patronize the store that buys the non-union product
or that they refuse to buy the product itself. The use of "primary"
or "secondary" boycott to characterize this activity, however important
in labor law, is inappropriate when determining whether a particular
form of expression is protected under the First Amendment. What
must be determined under the analysis proposed is whether or not con-
sumers can lawfully make such a decision. No law prohibits consum-
ers from patronizing only those stores which exclusively sell products
grown or manufactured by union labor. It cannot therefore be said
that the picketers are advocating action that is unlawful.
The biggest problem with the "unlawful purpose" doctrine is -that
in most instances -the alleged adverse effect of the advocated action
on the state law invoked to justify regulation of the picketing is re-
mote and speculative at best. The lawfulness of the advocacy -must
be determined in light of whether or not the person to whom the mes-
sage is aimed lawfullly can embark on that particular course of action
urged.
The basic premise of the foregoing analysis is that consumers are
continually making choices that are both economically and socially mo-
tivated. In fact, an increasing amount of commercial advertising of
late is being devoted to enlisting the political and social sympathies
of the consumer. Many large corporations spend substantial portions
of their advertising budgets on "public image" advertisements which
inform consumers of -how much the corporation is doing for the en-
vironment, or how many jobs it has created for low income minority
workers. 1  One cannot escape the fact that there is a class of con-
sumers today who regards its consumer dollar as a vote cast for or
against ,the broader social issues with which it is concerned. In the
vast majority of cases, the choice that is urged by -the picketers is one
of several equally valid and lawful alternatives open to the consuming
public. 2 It is submitted that -there are no overwhelming policy rea-
sons to justify restriction of such activities.
91. See, e.g., Promoting Nature's Friends, TIME, vol. 96, Aug. 17, 1970, at 58-
59. Indeed corporations have themselves begun to perceive their role in society in dif-
ferent non-economic terms. Today, corporate decisions are influenced to a larger ex-
tent by the concept that business has a broader social obligation in addition to its
profit-making one. See generally D. VoTAw & S. SaTin, Tm CoRPoRArE DILEMMA:
TRADrriONAL VALuES VERSUS CONTEMPORARY PROBLEMS (1973); C. WALTON, CoRPo-
RATE SocIAL RESPONSIBILITIES (1967).
92. Where the action advocated is concededly unlawful, the analysis becomes
twofold. Firstly, is the law in question the type of law that justifies an infringement
on First Amendment rights? Secondly, is the application of the law to the particular
action advocated overly broad? For example, is the state justified in applying its anti-
trust laws to picketing aimed at consumers? Anti-trust laws are designed to enhance
the efficient working of the marketplace. In publicity picketing, -there is no concerted
aption on the part of consumers. Each consumer makes an independent decision on
Conclusion
The decisions of the United States Supreme Court regarding the
applicability of First Amendment protections to picketing as a form
of expression have left confusion in their wake. Following Teamsters
Local 695 v. Vogt, it appeared that the Court had locked itself into
a position that virtually excluded picketing from any protection under
the First Amendment. NLRB v. Fruit Packers Local 760 and Police
Department v. Mosley, on the other hand, indicated that the Court
was still searching, and that the Thornhill doctrine was not of purely
historical interest.
Scrutiny of the law in this area cannot yield any meaningful tools
for analysis without first resolving which aspects of picketing are
"speech" and which are "conduct," and the division of picketing into
"signal" and "publicity" picketing goes the furthest toward resolving
the speech/conduct dilemma which plagued the Court in the earlier
picketing cases. Because publicity picketing appeals to an uncoerced
audience, whose support can be enlisted only through persuasion, it
must be classified as speech.
Once publicity picketing is so defined, the applicability of First
Amendment protections should be determined in light of the test pro-
pounded in Brandenburg v. Ohio, because the state, by characterizing
the picketers' purpose as unlawful, is in effect claiming that the pick-
eters are advocating an unlawful course of action. Speculation as to
the ultimate harmful effects of such picketing is not sufficient to justify
its regulation; instead, there must be a direct connection between the
action advocated and the law used to justify regulation of the picket-
ing.
The importance of picketing as a mode of expression cannot be
over-emphasized. For small and relatively weak groups, this is often
the only avenue open to them in attempting to achieve their valid so-
cial objectives. Indeed, the First Amendment affords its most mean-
ingful protections when the rights of the weak and the powerless are
at stake. The mere fact that these views are being voiced in a non-
traditional forum-the marketplace-does not diminish their impor-
whether or not to patronize the particular store, or buy the particular product. As was
discussed before, the efficient working of the economic system depends on consumers
making decisions based on any information they feel is relevant. "[Elven though the
governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose cannot be pursued by
means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can be more nar-
rowly achieved. The breadth of legislative abridgement must be viewed in the light
of less drastic means for achieving the same basic purpose." Shelton v. Tucker, 364
U.S. 479, 488 (1960); cf., NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288, 308 (1964), accord,
Aptheker v. Secretary of State, 378 U.S. 500, 512-14 (1964).
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tance. We must, therefore, remain ever vigilant against infringement
of First Amendment rights not only by "heavy-handed frontal attack,
but also from being stifled by more subtle governmental influence." 93
Manuela Albuquerque Scott*
93. Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 523 (1960).
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